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Jeltje van der Meer-Kooistra
SOM-theme E  Financial markets and institutions
	
This paper is concerned with investigating the role of accounting practices in radical change
processes. The institutional framework has been taken as a starting point in investigating these
processes. The research has been carried out at the Dutch Railways. This company was forced by the
Dutch government to change from a public company into a private company. This decision by the
Dutch Government has had radical consequences for Dutch Railways’ position in the (rail) transport
market and for the way of managing the company. The research focuses on the processes in which the
company has changed its template as a public company into a profit-oriented template. This paper
examines the interaction of accounting practices with the environmental and organisational context.
Emphasis is placed on how these mutual processes of interaction change internal and external
positioning, create new visibilities, transform perspectives on organisational activities and performance
and modify conditions for organisational change. Existing institutional concepts regarding change
processes are evaluated in the light of the case findings and building blocks are developed for a
comprehensive change framework.
Keywords: radical change processes; accounting practices; environmental and organisational context;
change framework; longitudinal case study
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Continuous changes in organisations’ environment have made organisational change
an important research issue. Many accounting scholars have investigated how
organisations have adopted and implemented new accounting instruments (see 
Anderson, 1995; Shields, 1995; Bjørnenak, 1997; Vaivio, 1999; Malmi, 1999). Other
scholars (see  Burns & Scapens, 2000) focus their research on the problems
organisations struggle with in making changes. They explain the processes of
resistance to change. In these studies the adoption of a new accounting instrument is
seen as the originator of change processes through which the instrument is
implemented. This study will take a different perspective. It does not see accounting
instruments as the originator of change processes, but as a means to contribute to and
shape change processes an organisation has to go through due to institutional
pressures from outside. The study is focused on the role accounting instruments can
play in realising radical changes and in the demands made on the development and
use of these instruments in order to be able to play such a role. Various authors (see
 Dent, 1991; Hopwood, 1987; Miller & O’Leary, 1987; Ogden, 1995, 1997) have
stressed the pro-active capacity of accounting in changing organisational priorities
and legitimating new organisational purposes, structures and practices.
This study investigates the processes of developing accounting practices that
function as a means to transform a public company into a profit-oriented company.
The institutional framework has been taken as a starting point in investigating
changes in accounting practices. As Macintosh & Scapens (1990) argue, accounting
practices provide an interpretive scheme for making sense of organisational activities.
Accounting practices as institutionalised routines further organisational coherence
and create stability and social order within an uncertain world. They also give
external legitimacy to the organisational activities and the way of organising them.
Accounting practices are influenced by the institutional environment and by the
knowledge and experience of the people involved in the organisational activities. As
the institutional environment is subject to changes and people are learning by doing
accounting practices will evolve in the course of time. Evolution of practices means
that they cannot be seen in isolation from the past. Evolution is the reproduction of
behaviours through time (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Even when radical changes are at stake past behaviours are not thrown overboard
completely. Heiner (1983) concludes that the greater the level of uncertainty the more
likely rule-based behaviour. In order to create stability in an uncertain situation
people will try to stick to routines which have proven to be effective till now.
However, when they feel that past practices are no longer suitable for the new
situation, they are forced to create new routines. In particular, when the change is
induced by the institutional environment,  new regulations by the government,
3changes in the market position leading to customers changing their preferences, or
new technology with far-reaching consequences for the product features and the
production processes, people within the organisation are forced to change their
behaviour radically, otherwise the continuity of the organisational activities will be
threatened. Another related issue regards the pace at which a radical change will be
achieved. Combining insights from the old and the new institutionalism Greenwood
& Hinings (1996) have developed a model for understanding organisational change
which is able to explain the orientation and the pace of change.
In the early nineties the government decided to change the position of the Dutch
Railways. The Dutch Railways used to be a public organisation. As in other West
European countries the effectiveness and efficiency of public companies became a
matter of discussion for the Dutch government. The idea was that the market would
be a more effective and efficient governance structure than the public structure. So,
the government decided to change the position of the Dutch Railways into a private
profit-oriented company which should be exposed to market forces. This paper
investigates what changes the Dutch Railways have made and are still making in
order to become a profit-oriented company and to be able to compete with other (rail)
transport companies.
The transformation from a public company into a private company has radical
consequences for Dutch Railways’ position in the market and for the way in which
the company is managed. Issues that were irrelevant before the change need special
attention now and appear on the agenda. Different kinds of information are required.
The company needs knowledge and experience in functional areas not covered till
now. Radical changes require radical answers. As the company has to make a new
start the existing routines and habits have little value. New organisational institutions
need to be created and new accounting practices put into place in order to ensure
appropriate behaviour and organisational coherence. As the ties with the past must be
broken we may expect that new organisational and accounting techniques will come
to the fore. Being forced to introduce radical changes throughout the whole company
with consequences for a broad array of activities and for all functional areas leads to
decisions the consequences of which cannot be foreseen completely. This means that
decision-makers will be confronted with unintended effects and counterproductive
consequences. In such complicated situations decision-makers should be enabled to
learn from their decisions. Decisions must be open to reconsideration or withdrawal.
As Briers & Chua (1999) conclude the ‘facts’ of changes are clear in hindsight, but
they are not so certain in the making. Furthermore, the written and tacit knowledge
and experience in the company have to be mobilised for such far-reaching decisions.
Without the commitment of all people in the company such radical changes cannot be
made. These changes require several interconnected forces. As Vaivio (1999) argues
radical changes are associated with an intended and systematic organisational
4initiative in order to integrate them in the management process and to turn them into
‘organizationally constitutive artifacts’ (p. 429).
In studying the processes of developing accounting practices that support the
radical change the Dutch Railways has to make, this research focuses in particular on
the following questions. First, which changes have been made in the organisational
structure, the external and internal positioning of organisational units and accounting
practices? Related to this, how systematically have these changes been developed and
implemented and what has been the role of accounting practices in realising the
radical change? Second, who are involved in developing and implementing these
changes and what are the influences from the institutional environment on the choices
which have been made? Who have delivered the required knowledge and experience
for making the change and for managing the ‘new’ organisation? Third, how has the
company dealt with not being able to foresee all the consequences of the changes
beforehand due to bounded rationality arguments? How has the company learned
from the effects of decisions and how have learning processes effected the pace of
change? Fourth, what is the ability of existing change frameworks to understand the
complexity of radical change processes and the diversity and intertwinement of the
mobilising factors?
The radical change, which the Dutch Railways has had to go through, has
consequences for the whole organisational context and its position in the
environment. It influences its relation, not only with the government, but also with
both internal and external customers. The company has to work in another
competitive environment and to face new competitors. It has to re-determine its
position in the market, and these changes in its environmental position have to be
taken into account when deciding on new accounting practices. These practices
should enable the company to make changes in its environmental position and, related
to this, in the organisational units’ position within the company. Therefore, in
studying change processes emphasis is placed on the organisational embeddedness of
accounting practices and on their interaction with the institutional environment.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 theoretical concepts will be
discussed which give an insight into radical change processes by explaining the
factors that play a role in such processes and influence the adoption, development and
use of accounting practices. In section 3 the research method will be described and
information will be given about the activities and organisational structure of the
Dutch Railways and specifically about the business unit NedTrain, where the case
research was carried out. Sections 4 and 5 will describe the case research results. In
section 4 the paper will focus on changes in the organisational structure and the
internal and external positioning of NedTrain. Section 5 will investigate the role that
accounting practices have played in supporting changes in the framework of
accountability and in organisational reality. In section 6 the change patterns which
5were observed at NedTrain will be discussed. These patterns will be compared with
the theoretical concepts and conclusions will be drawn about their contributions to
understanding radical change processes. Based on this comparison the building blocks
of a comprehensive change framework will be identified and discussed. The paper
will be rounded off by some concluding remarks.
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Greenwood & Hinings (1996) distinguish radical change versus convergent change,
on the one hand, and revolutionary versus evolutionary change, on the other. The first
distinction refers to the type of change, while the second distinction involves the pace
and extent of the change processes. They describe radical change as ‘the busting loose
from an existing “orientation” and the transformation of an organisation’ (p. 1024).
Convergent change is ‘fine tuning the existing orientation’ (p. 1024). Making radical
changes can take place in a revolutionary way, i.e. these changes are made swiftly and
regard the whole organisation. Radical changes can also be made slowly and affect
only specific parts or processes of the organisation; then the changes are evolutionary.
Institutional theory assumes that organisational behaviours are influenced by
ideas, values and beliefs, which come from the institutional context. The institutional
context includes pressures from the market the organisation is exposed to, pressures
from regulatory bodies, such as national and international governmental bodies and
professional agencies, and pressures from general social expectations and from
leading organisations. Part of these pressures are general in the sense that all
organisations are exposed to these pressures, while others are more specific and
influence only some organisations. In order to gain legitimacy and to increase their
probability of survival organisations have to conform to the institutional pressures.
That is why institutional theorists (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Hopwood, 1987;
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1983) observe that organisations adopt the same
organisational form or, as formulated by DiMaggio & Powell (1991), ‘template for
organizing’ (p. 27). The term ‘template for organizing’ refers to a particular
configuration or pattern of an organisation’s structures and systems based on ideas,
beliefs and values. When an organisation moves from one template (or archetype) –
the template-in-use - into another, it goes through a radical change process, ‘because
it represents the breaking of the mold defined by an interpretive scheme’ (Greenwood
& Hinings, 1996, p. 1026). But, thinking in terms of templates, and seeing mimetic,
normative and coercive pressures as part of the institutional context, we may expect
convergence around templates leading to stability, rather then radical change and
instability.
6Greenwood & Hinings (1996) have developed a model which provides an
explanation of the character of change and of the pace and scale of change processes.
They question why organisations make radical changes, when convergence around
templates and stability are more likely. Organisations which are strongly embedded in
their organisational context – are tightly coupled to a prevailing archetype – will face
a higher degree of instability when they are exposed to external shocks. Greenwood
& Hinings assume that the changes these organisations face will be of a radical nature
and will take place in a revolutionary way (see also DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In
particular, changes in mature organisational fields (such as accounting, law and the
public sector), which are tightly coupled and which are exposed to high pressures for
conformity, will be radical. Tightly coupled fields are less open to alternative
organisational forms, as the orientation of these fields has a strong internal focus.
In the case of the Dutch Railways the organisation was forced by the Dutch
government to change its template-in-use. The Dutch Railways had a long tradition as
a public organisation, so turning its traditional template into a template of a profit
oriented organisation involves a radical change which affects the whole company.
The Dutch Railways used to have a protected position without any competition in the
Dutch market for rail transport. The company operated in a tightly coupled field with
a strong internal focus. Due to its secure position it was less open to alternative
organisational forms. The government not only forced the company to make a radical
change, but also indicated the period within which this change should be made. The
change had to be completed within five years, which is a rather short period for such a
comprehensive change.
Greenwood & Hinings (1996) argue that, in addition to the characteristics of the
field an organisation belongs to, the internal characteristics of an individual
organisation also influence its response to changes in the institutional environment.
They look at four characteristics which influence the dynamics of an organisation:
interests, values, power dependencies and capacity for action. Groups within an
organisation may have different interests and different patterns of value
commitments. If there are dissatisfied groups because they are not able to translate
their interests into the distribution of scarce organisational resources, and if these
groups realise that this unfavourable situation is caused by the template-in-use, they
will try to change the existing template. Their success will depend on the power
dependencies within the organisation and the capacity for action;  their ability to
manage the transition process from one template to another. Greenwood & Hinings
see power dependencies and capacity for action as the enablers of radical change. If
changes occur, the change will be radical, as dissatisfied and powerful groups strive
for a new template. Greenwood & Hinings assume that the change processes will be
evolutionary when other groups within the organisation are committed to the
7template-in-use. The pace of the change processes will be revolutionary when all
groups are opposed to the template-in-use.
At the Dutch Railways all the organisational units have to go through the change
processes. No group within the company can escape this change whatever its power
and interests. The only possibility is to try to slow down the pace of the change
processes in order to make them more evolutionary instead of revolutionary. Even
after their privatisation the Dutch Railways still attract lot of attention from
politicians, as before the change they used to approve capital investment and pricing
decisions, as well as from the public who are the users of their services. Important
decisions and bad service quality are front page news. So, it is not possible to make
superficial changes in order to legitimate themselves to the institutional environment
without making real changes inside the organisation. But to make real changes
requires the organisation to have the ability to realise them. The Dutch Railways has a
long tradition as a public company in which the trade unions have a strong position.
Changing individual perceptions, cognitions and preferences stemming from such a
long tradition is a difficult task. In performing this task the management have to be
aware of the institutionalised way of thinking and doing of the various groups in their
company.
Greenwood & Hinings (1996) described the external and internal factors that
influence the decision to make a radical change and the pace of this change. Their
model shows the interplay of external and internal factors leading individual
organisations to adopt or discard new templates for organising. They do not describe
in-depth the processes along which the radical change takes place, nor do they discuss
the means and instruments which are used in implementing the radical change. As we
are interested in the role of accounting practices in radical change processes, we
emphasise a processual perspective in this study. Moreover, we assume that not only
the accounting practices as such will support the change processes but that also the
processes of adopting and developing accounting practices will shape them. Hopwood
(1987) argues ‘[a]ccounting is in the process of being seen as an organisational
practice in motion, the changes and consequences of which are dependent on its
intertwining with other approaches to the creation of a manageable organisational
regime’ (p. 214). He concludes that ‘accounting, by intersecting with other
organisational processes and practices, influences the patterns of organisational
visibility, significance, structure and action’ (p. 225).
A more in-depth discussion of how organisations adopt and develop accounting
practices is given by Abrahamson (1991; 1996) and Briers & Chua (1999). These
authors also take an institutional perspective, in that they assume that external and
internal institutional pressures influence decision-making within organisations.
Abrahamson asserts that external institutional pressures will hardly play any role in
the adoption decision, if organisations do not face uncertainty. If organisations know
8their goals and are able to assess the efficiency of accounting practices, they will
adopt those accounting practices which enable them to attain their goals in an
efficient way. They will search for new practices, if, due to external and internal
developments, organisational performance gaps occur. This efficient-choice
perspective, which assumes that organisations can make a rational choice, is the most
dominant perspective in the innovation diffusion literature.
Briers & Chua (1999) are of the opinion that accounting changes will always
cause uncertainty: ‘accounting changes are highly fluid, precarious and unpredictable’
(p. 29). This conclusion is in line with the findings by Hopwood (1987) and Bhimani
(1993), who argue that accounting change is determined by circumstance and by
multiple and even conflicting possibilities. Abrahamson assumes that, under
conditions of uncertainty, organisations imitate other organisations. In such cases, the
behaviour in adoption decisions can be characterised as copycat behaviour. Imitated
organisations can be of the fashion-setting type, such as consulting organisations,
business schools, business mass media etc., or can belong to the same group. This
latter form of imitation focuses partly on arguments of social interactions due to
which organisations try to legitimate themselves by adopting emergent norms within
their group (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977).
Briers & Chua (1999) argue that the training and experience of individuals plays
a central role in the processes of adopting and developing accounting practices. The
individuals involved in the change processes can come from both inside and outside
the organisation. They stress the role of actor networks of internal/local occupational
groups and external/cosmopolitan knowledge experts, who mutually influence and
reinforce each other in making changes. Cosmopolitans are global actors with an
orientation across spatial and cultural boundaries and with global expertise.
Consultants of internationally operating consulting organisations with access to
knowledge and technologies originating at different places and in different local
circumstances are examples of cosmopolitan actors. Together with their standardised
packages of accounting systems, software, etc. they are able to create ‘hard facts’ by
which the local actors gain faith in new accounting practices and believe that these
practices promise a better future. Internal occupational groups struggling for
ascendancy by means of superior knowledge of the business in order to gain
professional control and legitimacy influence the path to a better future. They do this
by cooperating with cosmopolitan networks and by making use of the standardised
technologies developed by these networks. Both local and cosmopolitan actors try to
strengthen the network in order to strengthen their interests.
What Briers & Chua described are processes of learning by doing, of searching
for new coalitions of individuals, of using rhetoric, of redefining the problem, and of
influencing priority setting. Their fieldwork showed that in advance there is no
detailed plan of the changes to be made and the consequences of actions taken are
9only becoming clear in the course of time. This means that change processes cannot
be planned comprehensively. They are made in a step-by-step way, where the
outcome of actions forms the input for new actions and going back on previous
decisions wil be required. Burns & Scapens (2000) argue that change processes are
path dependent even when the change is radical, because they are, to some extent,
influenced by existing routines and the established context of the organisation.
Burns & Scapens (2000) stress the role of taken-for-granted rules and routines for
change processes. They argue that individuals within organisations act according to
habits and generally accepted rules of behaviour. By repeatedly following rules
behaviour may become programmatic and so, routines may emerge. Organisational
changes which require individuals within the organisation to accept new rules and
routines are difficult to realise, as individuals are not explicitly aware of the rules and
routines which underpin their way of acting and behaving. If (groups of) individuals
have enough power within the organisation, they can change the existing rules and
routines. Studying processes of accounting change in a particular case Burns (2000)
found that power over resources, decision making and perceptions turned out to be
insufficient for realising change as long as the existing taken-for-granted assumptions
and beliefs have not been changed. The widely accepted rules and routines form an
inherent feature of the management control process. Thus, a need to change the
existing rules and routines implies a change of the existing management control
process.
The Dutch Railways were forced to change their template-in-use. Some
organisations have the legitimate power to dictate which template and/or
administrative technologies should be adopted. Governmental bodies, trade unions
and professional associations are examples of organisations that have this power
(Abrahamson, 1996). Although the Dutch Railways were forced to make a radical
change, the management themselves were able to choose the means and techniques
with which to make such a change. Moreover, they were able to follow their ideas of
how a private company should be structured and should decide and act.
Taking the viewpoint that accounting has to be studied in the process of
becoming, this study will concentrate on how the Dutch Railways have adopted and
developed accounting practices together with other organisational practices. As
pointed out earlier radical change processes influence the position of an organisation
in its environment. This means that an organisation which goes through radical
change processes is faced with discussions about its boundaries: which activities
should it perform itself and which transactional relations should it set up with other
organisations and, if so, with which organisations? Radical change processes will also
influence the internal organisation of the activities and the positioning of
organisational units. In the literature much attention has been paid to these issues of
governance structure. Transaction cost economics has tried to build a theoretical
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framework for decisions concerning organisational boundaries. This framework
(Williamson, 1975, 1985) distinguishes three critical transaction characteristics
(frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity), the degree of which influences the
choice of governmental arrangements. The more uncertainty and the more asset
specificity, given frequent transactions, the higher the transaction costs in the case of
market transactions. Once commitments have been made with an independent party
hold-up problems can arise as that party will acquire an increasingly monopolistic
position. Due to uncertainty comprehensive contracting is impossible and due to the
specific investments discontinuing the relation will be costly. Therefore, bringing
these transactions within the hierarchy has transaction cost advantages.
Transaction cost reasoning can also be used for the internal organisation of
activities within a hierarchy. Various studies (see  Eccles, 1985; Spicer, 1988; Van
der Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Colbert & Spicer, 1995) show that within the hierarchy
different governance structures can be set up for the internal transactions. These
structures could have bureaucratic characteristics, being grounded in specified rules,
standards, orders and a system of surveillance, evaluation and direction. It is also
possible to introduce more market characteristics within the company. Structures,
within which more or less independent business units operate which are allowed to
start transactional relations within the company but also with external parties, give
these units the authority to decide themselves on the transaction parties and on the
transaction terms. Transaction cost arguments can partly explain such differences in
governance structures within the hierarchy. Other arguments are based on the
strategic importance of the transactions (Colbert & Spicer, 1995), task complexity and
the influence of information asymmetry between the internal transactional parties and
the central management (Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994). According to Van der Meer-
Kooistra, the interconnection between the co-ordination of internal transactions and
the other management accounting systems, such as performance measurement and
evaluation systems and rewarding systems, also influences the governance structure
of internal transactions.
Moreover, the organisational and social embeddedness of the internal
transactions matters when deciding on how to co-ordinate them. Sako (1992) and
Holmström & Roberts (1998) also emphasise the importance of transactional
embeddedness. They observe that ever more internal transactions are executed
through the market, even when transaction cost arguments are in favour of governing
them through the hierarchy. According to Holmström & Roberts (1998) there is ‘a
trend today toward disintegration, outsourcing, contracting out, and dealing through
the market rather than bringing everything under the umbrella of the organization’ (p.
80). They conclude that there are evidently other arguments than the transaction cost
ones that also influence the governance structure decision. They argue that interfirm
relations exist due to the benefits both parties can derive from transactions which
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have a long-term and repeated nature. Current behaviour is disciplined by the long-
term perspective of continuing transactions which will be a source of future rewards.
Continuing interaction strengthens trust between the parties. The network approach
(see  Johanson & Mattson, 1987; Håkansson & Johanson, 1988; Easton, 1989)
sees trust as an important variable for the explanation of the origin and growth of
networks. Other researchers (Sako, 1992; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Chiles &
McMackin, 1996; Nooteboom, Berger & Noorderhaven, 1997; Van der Meer-
Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000) also assert that trust plays a role in co-operation, and
that co-operation is not only a matter of coercion and incentives as argued by
transaction cost reasoning. Granovetter (1985) claims that there is a significant social
component in exchange relations. The social embeddedness of transactions has
important trust creating value.
As indicated above, the governance structure discussion concerns both the
organisational boundary and the positioning of organisational units within the
organisation and their positioning towards the external market. These positioning
decisions influence the organisational context in which accounting practices have to
operate and, thus, they will influence the choice of accounting practices and their
functioning. Shank & Govindarajan (1993) argue that organisations with a centralised
structure partly use other accounting practices than those with a decentralised
structure, and, if using the same practices, they use them differently ( tight versus
loose budget targets).
The theoretical ideas about change processes in organisations discussed above
differ in various respects. First, they look at different phases of the change process.
Greenwood & Hinings (1996) study the change process as a whole and are interested
in its character. Abrahamson (1991; 1996) focuses on adoption processes, whereas
Briers & Chua (1999) take a longitudinal perspective and study processes of both
adoption, implementation and usage of new accounting practices. Transaction cost
reasoning does not look at change processes but describes the most efficient status
quo situation. Second, there is a different view on the factors that influence change
processes. Greenwood & Hinings argue that both external and internal factors play a
role, while Burns & Scapens (2000) focus on processes within organisations. Briers &
Chua look at the interplay of knowledge and experience of internal and external
actors. Transaction cost reasoning uses both external and internal factors in
determining the governance structure with the lowest transaction costs. Third, the
change concepts differ in their assumptions which underlie decision-making
processes. Transaction cost reasoning starts from the view that there is one decision-
maker who makes a deliberate choice. S/he decides purposely and weighs the pros
and cons of alternative actions by looking at their consequences. The decision-maker
does not face cognitive constraints and makes optimal decisions. The other concepts
take another view, namely that decision-makers are bounded by both cognitive and
12
institutional constraints (see also Roberts & Greenwood, 1997). In this view decisions
and actions are largely influenced by standard patterns of behaviour and much less by
deliberate choice. March & Simon (1993, p. 8) speak of two different logics of action:
a ‘logic of consequences’, which relates to the first view on decision-making, and a
‘logic of appropriateness’, which relates to the second view. In the second view the
reaction to changing circumstances is determined primarily by routines. These
routines can be based on institutional pressures. Individuals can learn and are able to
change their routines. Learning processes occur gradually and have the character of
incremental deviations. Learning is an embedded process that is coupled to past and
present experiences and routines. Both learning and change are influenced by existing
organisational capabilities and procedures.
Our study takes a longitudinal perspective and will look at all the phases change
processes go through. Further, it starts from the assumption that both external and
internal factors matter. Therefore, it will focus on the alignment between external
circumstances and pressures and internal capabilities, and it will try to understand
how accounting practices are used in these alignment processes and influence the
outcome of these processes. Moreover, we assume that individuals are constrained in
their decision-making due to cognitive limitations and institutional pressures. This
implies that radical changes cannot be comprehensively planned beforehand, but that
decision-makers will make decisions step-by-step enabling them to learn from earlier
decisions and their effects. So, radical changes cannot be made in isolation from the
past and need continuous decision-making in the course of time.
We will use the external and internal factors mentioned in the change concepts
described above as a starting point in the investigation of the radical change processes
at the Dutch Railways. In Figure 1 we give an overview of these factors.






Institutional pressures ( Norms and values
organisational field, and Rules and routines 
fashion-setting organisations) Power dependencies
Social embeddedness Capacity for action
Global actors and expertise Asset specificity
Standardised technologies Information asymmetry
Uncertainty Task complexity
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The research aim is to study the processes of developing accounting practices and
their contribution to the transformation of the Dutch Railways into a private company.
In studying these processes we will use the change concepts, as discussed in section
2. This allows investigating the ability of these concepts to understand the complexity
of radical change processes. Moreover, using the findings of the case research we will
try to construct a change framework.
Two governmental decisions influenced the position and functioning of the
Dutch Railways radically. First, the decision by the Dutch government to privatise the
company, and second, the decision by the European Commission to divide the
national railway companies in Europe into an operating part and an infrastructure part
and to divide the financing of both parts. The aim of the European Commission is to
stimulate competition between railway companies, which becomes possible when the
operating activities are no longer related to the infrastructure ownership. The
privatisation decision concerns the operating part of the Dutch Railways, whereas the
infrastructure will remain government owned. The Dutch government decided in the
first place that the operating activities of the Dutch Railways should be carried out
independently of the government and that the company should operate as a private
company. After having made the privatisation decision, the government made clear
that they were planning to list the company at the stock exchange. Following the
railway accidents in England in recent years, the cause of which has been attributed to
the privatisation of British Rail, this idea has been under discussion again.
Figure 2 shows the present organisational structure of the operating activities of
the Dutch Railways. At the end of 1999 the Goods Traffic business unit was taken




Public Transport runs the trains. Stations is responsible for running the railway
stations with the shopping and restaurant areas. Facility Services runs all the
buildings. NedTrain and Facility Services are internal service units.
The research has been carried out at NedTrain. NedTrain is a legally independent
unit within the Dutch Railways which is responsible for its own results. Its activities
comprise short-term maintenance and repair, long-term maintenance in the form of
refurbishment or overhaul, and technical advice about the purchase of new rolling
stock and refurbishment and overhaul of existing rolling stock. NedTrain has about
4000 employees, most of whom have an engineering background. Short-term
maintenance and repair is carried out by the organisational unit Maintenance and
Services, which is geographically divided into 4 regions and has nearly 3000
employees. The organisational unit Refurbishment and Overhaul, with about 1000
employees, is responsible for the long-term maintenance and carries out its activities
in two overhaul locations. Technical advice is given by NedTrain Consulting, which
organisational unit is located at the Dutch Railways headquarters and has about 200
employees.
In order to get an in-depth insight into the change processes at NedTrain we have
studied company reports and other written material concerning this subject. Further,
we have interviewed people involved in these change processes in different positions
and performing their roles at different places. The interviews took place at the central
level of NedTrain and at the organisational units Refurbishment and Overhaul and
NedTrain Consulting. These units have different characteristics. Refurbishment and
Overhaul is a production oriented unit with production processes and investments in
machines and equipment. NedTrain Consulting’s main resources are knowledge and
the experience of its employees. NedTrain Consulting sells hours, whereas
Refurbishment and Overhaul sells production capacity. The employees of NedTrain
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employees of Refurbishment and Overhaul. The interviews lasted between two to
eight hours. We have interviewed some people several times, over a lengthy period.
Figure 3 gives an overview of the positions of the people interviewed. The interviews
were carried out in the period of October 1998 till February 2000. Taking such a long
period offered the opportunity to study decision making processes during which
opinions were changing due to new information and advancing insight into decision
outcomes.
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Central level: management accountant (member of the management team); 3
interviews
Refurbishment and Overhaul: central manager (1 interview) and central management
accountant (1 interview)
NedTrain Consulting: central manager (1 interview) and central management
accountant (4 interviews); two managers (1 interview each) and two management
accountants of NedTrain Consulting units (2 interviews)
In the next two sections the findings of the research at NedTrain will be
described. In section 4 we will start by investigating how the company has dealt with
its positioning in the (rail) transport market as a consequence of privatisation. We will
also look at the influences of its external positioning on the internal organisational
structure,  how should the various activities be organised and how should the
newly established organisational units cope with each other and with the external
parties. The new external and internal positioning determines the context within
which accounting practices have to operate in order to support the change towards
privatisation. In section 5 we will investigate the decision-making processes of
adopting and implementing new accounting practices by means of which the
NedTrain management thinks that they will be able to act as a private company.    
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The Dutch Railways’ managements faced the enormous task of turning their public
organisation into a private operating company. One of the first questions they asked
was: What are the main characteristics of such a company? From the beginning the
management focused on three characteristics: profitability, customers’ wishes and
market position. Another question was: How can we bring it about that people
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throughout the company become aware of these three characteristics and make them
prominent in their acting and decision-making? The management was convinced that
an important step towards such a change in mindset was a change in the
organisational structure. This change would alter the positioning of the company
including its various organisational units in the market, and moreover, the positioning
of the organisational units within the company. In order to understand the decisions
concerning the external and internal positioning and their significance for the
activities throughout the company, we start by describing the organisational context
where the Dutch Railways including NedTrain started from.
As a public company the Dutch Railways had a monopoly position in the Dutch
market. Due to this the Dutch government was the most important stakeholder (and
also the only shareholder). The company had to take into account the political wishes
of the government. Moreover, the company had to pay attention to its customers: the
train passengers and the businesses demanding transport of goods. The Dutch
Railways had to deliver specific products at costs agreed in advance with the Dutch
government. The government decided on the quantity of the products and on the
tariffs for public transport and goods traffic. The Dutch Railways focused on the
technological ability to deliver the required products. The only constraints were the
yearly cost budgets. Technology and safety were given most attention. The focus of
the company was largely internally oriented. Marketing hardly played a role. The
management’s interest in the financial aspects remained restricted to negotiating with
the government about the budget and ensuring expenditure did not exceed it. The
Dutch Railways was a technologically oriented monopolist with managers and
employees with a technological background. Efficiency was not a real issue because
the Dutch Railways was the only supplier of public and goods transport in the
Netherlands. The Dutch Railways was a bureaucratic, centralistic and functionally
designed organisation.
This situation also holds for the internal service department NedTrain. NedTrain
used to deliver its services only internally. NedTrain was the owner of the rolling
stock. Its tasks were maintaining the technological performance of existing rolling
stock through regular inspection and repair, and through overhaul work and
conversion in the long-term, and buying new rolling stock. NedTrain decided how the
regular maintenance, overhaul and conversion should take place. The units which had
to take care of public transport and goods traffic had only limited influence on the
maintenance of the rolling stock. NedTrain was a technologically driven unit.
NedTrain was a cost centre charged with keeping costs within the cost budget. The
only function of the financial administration was cost budget control. Profits and
results were not recorded and there were no records with which financial results could
be related to operational activities. The basic records were not there: NedTrain had no
assets and debtor accounts nor a profit and loss account. Most of the attention was
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focused on the number of technical failures per million kilometres and the availability
of rolling stock. It was also important that critical overhaul terms should not be
exceeded.
The Dutch Railways’ central management decided to introduce a business unit
structure (see Figure 2). The business units were made responsible for their own
profit and had to deal with their own customers, whether internal or external. The
reason why the Dutch Railways’ management decided to make the organisational
units more independent was twofold. First, their view was this would stimulate the
units’ management to pay in particular attention to their profitability, their customers’
wishes and their market position. Second, they were of the opinion that confronting
the units with more market competition would enhance the effectiveness and
efficiency of their operations (necessary conditions for being profitable) and would
make the customers, whether external or internal, more visible and perceptible
(necessary conditions for satisfying customers). Now the financial results count and
by introducing more market pressures within the company the business units are
forced to be aware of these results. In addition, there was the urgent need to decrease
the high budget overruns in the early nineties. The business units, including
NedTrain, have to prove to the central management and also to the Dutch government
that they are able to compete with other market parties and to react to customers’
wishes. The thesis that ‘more market is better’, is the prevailing idea both of the
Dutch government (that is why it decided to privatise the Dutch Railways) and of the
central management of the Dutch Railways. The new organisational structure is a
result of this thesis. The company did not carry out any investigation into the
characteristics of the relations between the business units nor did it study the question
whether this structure would contribute to the aims of being profitable and satisfying
customers. So, we can conclude that this decision can be characterised as copycat
behaviour. The Dutch Railways’ central management followed the prevailing ideas in
both the private and public sector. Nowadays, many companies have a business unit
structure.
The consequences of the business unit structure for NedTrain were that it was
held responsible for its own profit, which implied that it had to pay attention to both
its costs  its revenues, and that the business units Public Transport and Goods
Traffic became the owners of the rolling stock. These units are now the customers of
NedTrain and negotiate with NedTrain about the required performance, time of
delivery, the costs, etc. NedTrain has to make a trade-off between the costs of the
technical performance and the price the customers are willing to pay. Until 2001
internal buying of maintenance has been guaranteed to some extent. From that date on
Public Transport has been allowed to buy all the maintenance services, overhaul and
conversion and technical advice about buying new rolling stock on the market. This
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influences the position of NedTrain within the Dutch Railways as well as its position
in the market.
In response to the change in the Dutch Railways’ organisational structure the
NedTrain management team1 decided to copy this structure into their own
organisation. They distinguished three business units which were made responsible
for their own results. These units are: Maintenance and Services, Refurbishment and
Overhaul, and NedTrain Consulting (see for a description of their activities section 3).
The NedTrain management was of the opinion that this structure would stimulate the
units’ management awareness of both their costs and revenues and their customers.
After this initial decision the discussion about the position of the three NedTrain
business units and their transactional relations with, in particular, the most important
internal customer Public Transport has started all over again. The NedTrain
management hold the view that the decision to make all the business units more
independent, both within the Dutch Railways and within NedTrain, was a good
decision to start with. According to them, this has led to business units which are now
aware of their costs and revenues and take the wishes of their customers into account.
Nevertheless, we observed that the positioning discussion is a continuing one, for
three reasons.
The first reason can be indicated as the learning reason. The company’s
managements, including the NedTrain management, had no experience with a
business unit structure. Moreover, by introducing this structure without an
investigation of its effects they were unable to foresee all its consequences. In the
course of time the disadvantages of operating apart from each other have become
more visible. An example of a disadvantage is that the customer Public Transport has
to cope with the sales departments of various NedTrain units within one project,
which is not very efficient. Therefore, the NedTrain management have decided to
combine the sales departments into a central department.
The second reason can be traced back to institutional pressures, in particular
governmental regulations, both national and European. Due to European regulations
aimed at opening up the national rail transport markets to international competition,
national governments have, in response to these regulations, taken decisions in order
to enable competition in their national markets. The Dutch government decided to
divide the Dutch Railways into an operating part and an infrastructure part. This latter
part has maintained its public structure. The consequence of this decision for
NedTrain was that the services they deliver to this infrastructure unit changed from
internal services to external ones. Due to this the relations with this customer have
                                                          
1
 The NedTrain management team consists of the central management, the management of the
NedTrain business units and the central management accountant. Henceforth, NedTrain
management will stand for NedTrain management team.
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changed. Moreover, the Dutch government decided that the Dutch Railways should
focus its activities on the core railroad network by opening up the regional railroad
lines to independent railroad companies by means of public tenders. The running of
the core railroad network was awarded to the Dutch Railways for ten years, which is a
relatively short period in comparison to the lifetime of the rolling stock (about thirty
years). This had as a consequence that the, formerly, internal services NedTrain
delivered to the regional railroad lines became external services with the new railroad
companies as its customers. Due to these decisions the number of services NedTrain
delivers internally has decreased. Therefore, developing its external relations and
being able to act in a competitive way is of great importance to NedTrain.
The third reason is market developments. As a private company the Dutch
Railways have to compete in the transport market. NedTrain is particularly
confronted with the activities of four big companies building rolling stock. These
companies are in the process of acquiring rolling stock maintenance companies. Their
strategy is that they not only can offer new rolling stock but that they will also be able
to sell all the maintenance required during the lifetime of the rolling stock. This
development threatens the position of the Dutch Railways vis-à-vis the rolling stock
builders and, in particular, the position of NedTrain in the market. The current
opinion within the Dutch Railways is that NedTrain is an important unit which
strengthens the position of the whole company in the market. They think that being
able to offer a complete package of public transport services including technical
maintenance, overhaul and technical advice determines the competitive value of the
company. Another development was the take-over of the business unit Goods Traffic
by the independent company Railion, which had as a consequence that this former
internal customer became an external market party.
The developments described above show that the rail transport market is in a
state of flux. The Dutch Railways have to act within a very uncertain environment.
This complicates the radical change processes, which as it is already cause
uncertainty. It is no surprise that the managements cannot foresee all the
consequences of their decisions and are trying to decrease uncertainty by both
showing copycat behaviour and taking step by step decisions which enables them to
acquire experience and to learn from former decisions. In the discussion about the
boundaries of the NedTrain business units we also observed a policy of avoiding
making far-reaching decisions. This policy prevents the company from taking
decisions that would be regretted afterwards. Although there are arguments to
outsource some activities, in particular long-term maintenance services delivered by
the Refurbishment and Overhaul business unit, the NedTrain management has
decided not to consider this for reasons of uncertainty. Moreover, they expect strong
resistance by the trade unions because of huge employment consequences. This might
lead to labour unrest and worsening of the work atmosphere for several years.
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The short-term maintenance activities carried out by Maintenance and Service,
and technical advice about the purchase of new rolling stock and the overhaul and
refurbishment of existing rolling stock given by NedTrain Consulting, will not be
outsourced. In order to execute these activities the company has made specific
investments in physical assets, human knowledge, and maintenance locations
throughout the country, along the railway tracks. Moreover, NedTrain has built up
long-term experience with the Dutch rail infrastructure and the behaviour of the
rolling stock with regard to this infrastructure. This knowledge is valuable when
buying new rolling stock, because it is needed for determining its functional
requirements and for assessing its life cycle costs. Further, they know the Dutch
standards and regulations, which also influence the functional requirements of new
rolling stock. This knowledge creates added value to the Dutch Railways. The
relations between NedTrain and Public Transport have a long-term and repetitive
character. Trustworthiness and knowing each other’s process characteristics and
problems are very important in this relationship. Another important aspect is that the
NedTrain headquarters, the unit NedTrain Consulting and Public Transport, are
located in the same building, which facilitates personnel contacts. That is why Public
Transport has emphasised that they consider the relationship with NedTrain
Consulting of strategic importance.
The arguments the company’s managements use are efficiency-oriented
arguments which can be traced back to transaction cost reasoning along with social
notions of trust and personal relationships. Further, we observe that not-knowing
future developments in the transport market influences to-day’s decision-making. The
decision-making can be characterised by avoiding making far-reaching decisions, no
regret afterwards, and cherishing what one possesses. This implies that some
important characteristics stemming from the template of a public company are still
there and influence current decision-making. Although the company strives for
efficient decision-making using arguments of profitability and satisfying customers, it
is limited in doing so by institutional and cognitive constraints.
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The previous section has shown that, by becoming a private company, the Dutch
Railways has transformed its framework for the accountability of the company as a
whole, but also of the various organisational units. The company and the
organisational units are now held accountable for their costs and revenues and for
their customers, whether internal or external. As pointed out earlier the Dutch
Railways’ central management goals are being profitable, satisfying customers and
being competitive. The NedTrain management have accepted these goals and aim at
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introducing them into their organisation. Changing NedTrain into a profit and
customer oriented business unit was an enormous step, as the prevailing orientation
used to be a technical and internally directed one. The information system processed
hardly any financial and commercial information and in the management board
financial and commercial expertise was lacking. In order to confront the participants
with another organisational reality which should include concepts such as return on
investment, customer satisfaction, market competitiveness, service orientation, the
NedTrain management had to construct a new language. The engineering oriented
participants who used to focus on technical aspects, such as the number of technical
failures per million kilometres and the availability of rolling stock, had to think and
act in another way with a prominent role for profitability, customers’ wishes and
market developments.
Research has shown that accounting practices can promote a new organisational
reality and introduce a new language (see  Dent, 1991; Hopwood, 1987; Miller
and O’Leary, 1990; Ogden, 1995). These practices can shape the behaviour of the
company’s participants because they can actively constitute the critical issues,
purposes and evaluation criteria which are important for realising the organisational
goals. Ogden (1995) showed in the case of the privatisation of the British Water
industry that considerable changes were made in the management information
systems in order to construct new organisational purposes, to shape new images of the
organisation and to reconsider its relationship with its environment. The Water
industry developed new planning and control mechanisms and new cost information
that gave a deeper insight into the costs of operational activities. Further, it introduced
performance indicators and output measures in order to evaluate and compare
achievements. It also spent a lot of effort on the training of management skills.
A similar development of accounting practices can be observed at the Dutch
Railways. It was the task of the managements throughout the company to change the
mindset of their people. Below we will discuss the actions taken by the NedTrain
management in order to implement such a change and their effects on people’s
behaviour. Our investigation is focused on both the factors that influence the
processes of accounting change and the character of the change processes. Further,
we want to know who were involved in developing and implementing the new
accounting practices and how these participants have dealt with institutional and
cognitive constraints. We will also discuss whether the actions were successful (or
not) in changing people’s mindset. We will start with the changes made at the level of





The change of NedTrain’s organisational structure altered NedTrain’s boundaries and
those of the three NedTrain’s business units. The aim was to create a new
organisational reality in which both NedTrain and its three organisational units should
take care of their costs and revenues and of their customers. This faced the NedTrain
management with the following problems. Till then they had not discussed their
positioning in the market and within the Dutch Railways. They expressed the need to
develop a strategy including their internal and external positioning. The aims of being
profitable and knowing one’s customers and competitors required an insight into the
financial results of each organisational unit, clear supplier-customer relations, and an
insight into market developments. These requirements were new as in the past there
were no pressures to pay attention to these issues. Information about financial and
customer aspects were lacking as well as market information. So, there was an urgent
need to set up a new management information system.
Another problem was that the NedTrain management needed a tool in order to
manage the various organisational units in such a way that the people within the units
would become aware of their financial and commercial performance. They used to be
informed about their technical performance for which they were held responsible. The
agenda was determined by technical issues. This had to change. In the decision-
making financial and commercial consequences should be considered along with
technical effects.
There was also the problem that the NedTrain management had no in-depth
knowledge of and experience with financial and commercial aspects. Their
appointment was based on technical knowledge and experience. Therefore, they
expressed the need of adding financial and commercial expertise to their ranks. In
addition, they realised that without any direct help from external experts they would
not succeed. The management was not familiar with such radical change processes
and adding new financial and commercial expertise to their ranks would take time.
The management decided to hire a consultant with expertise in these fields. This
consultant has contributed to a large extent to the change processes and has advised
NedTrain about the adoption of new accounting practices. In the course of time new
expertise has been added to the central management by the appointment of a financial
and a commercial chief executive. Also in the management of the NedTrain business
units managers from outside and with expertise in running private organisations have
been appointed.
How to change the mindset of the NedTrain people? They should learn what it
meant to have customers and to behave as a service provider. How could NedTrain be
attractive to external and internal customers? How could they compete with their
competitors? How could they make their service activities profitable? Also the
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internal customers should learn how to behave as customers. The consultant advised
to give priority to the introduction of new performance measures which would focus
on profitability and customers’ wishes. He recommended to introduce the concept of
the balanced scorecard for measuring and managing the business units’ performance.
His idea was that this concept could be used for decreasing the technical dominance
and putting financial and commercial issues high on the agenda. Moreover, it would
change people’s internal orientation into a more external orientation by taking
customers, competitors and market developments into consideration. All in all, the
concept of the balanced scorecard would support the new objectives, would create
new visibilities and would change people’s perspective on performance.
At the time of the decision to adopt the balanced scorecard, there was no clear
vision on the management control structure to be developed for NedTrain. Nor was
there a clear strategic vision on NedTrain’s position in the market and on its position
within the Dutch Railways. The management’s first concern was that the engineering
participants should be persuaded swiftly that technology costs money and that an
external orientation is required. The adoption decision of the balanced scorecard was
taken by the NedTrain management without investigating the costs of developing,
implementing and using this instrument.
In order to implement the balanced scorecard various workshops were organised
in which the concept of the balanced scorecard was explained to the central and
business unit managers and management accountants. Next, in each organisational
unit working-groups were set up for formulating critical success factors and
performance indicators per perspective. The perspectives were not related to each
other, so there was no question of an integrated approach. After a first choice made by
the business unit manager, the central manager made the definitive decision on the
critical success factors and performance indicators to be used per business unit. The
central management accountants developed the lay-out of the reports and the
information system supporting the reporting. Starting from 1995 NedTrain has been
using the balanced scorecard concept.
The introduction of the concept was a process of muddling through. As said
before, there were no strategy and clear objectives, nor did they have any experience
with target setting, and there was a lack of financial and commercial information. The
development of the balanced scorecard made clear that a discussion about strategy
and objectives was needed, and gave an insight into the information that should be
gathered. The development of a new information system went along with the
development of the balanced scorecard. As the duration of the implementation
process was rather tightly scheduled, it showed afterwards that a certain indistinctness
in the performance indicators had crept in. There were problems with the character of
some of them, with the uniformity of the concepts used and with the accessibility of
the reports. Some important performance indicators were not there, such as indicators
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of the aspects of customer satisfaction, internal processes and innovation. These
problems have been addressed in the course of time. It was very difficult to use
performance targets, as they did not know their objectives. Therefore, attention was
particularly focused on measuring performance without paying attention to
desirability and targets. At the beginning, the performance indicators were strongly
focused on the financial aspects. After the appointment of a commercial director on
the central management board more attention was paid to the customer and the
market. By means of a so called customer dashboard for the various markets a picture
of the relations with the customers has been drawn up.
The NedTrain management are of the opinion that the balanced scorecard has
functioned as a means to get a clearer picture of the effectiveness and efficiency of
NedTrain’s activities and NedTrain’s relations with its customers. It has backed up
the discussion about NedTrain’s strategic possibilities and strengths and weaknesses.
By using the balanced scorecard as the monthly means of reporting by the business
units managements to the central management, the agenda of the NedTrain
management meeting is to a large extent determined by the scorecards. So, financial
and commercial issues are now part of the language in addition to technical aspects.
They are still working on a better understanding of their activities in competitive
terms: what is their position in the market, what position do they strive for and how
do they want to compete with the big rolling stock building companies?
What we observe is the introduction of an instrument which with the NedTrain
management had no experience at all. The consultant strongly recommended its use
based on his experience in other companies. The conditions for its introduction were
minimal, because NedTrain did not know its strategy and objectives and lacked
information2. The instrument was used as a vehicle to change the mindset of the
engineers. It should change their perspective on performance, as ‘good’ performance
was no longer a synonym for using the best techniques, but should now be expressed
in financial terms and in terms of customer satisfaction. The instrument has changed
people’s vocabulary as it has been used prominently in the monthly management
meeting. The instrument had been developed in a step by step way along with the
development of a new information system, the discussion about NedTrain’s strategy
and its internal and external positioning, and the appointment of new managers with
financial and commercial expertise in the private sector. All these actions together
have determined how the organisation and its people are acting nowadays, without
having set up a detailed blueprint in advance of the way of acting.
                                                          
2
 The developers of the balanced scorecard concept, Kaplan & Norton (1996), argue that these
conditions should be fulfilled before starting with setting up a balanced scorecard.
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The introduction of new accounting practices at the central level was picked up by the
business units, the managements of which developed new practices geared to their
information needs and for managing their activities. The managements of the separate
business units, who were held responsible for their units’ results, decided to develop
scorecards for their own units. The central scorecards by means of which they
reported to NedTrain’s central management were not considered to be effective for
managing their own activities. They are too general and strongly financially focused.
The business unit managements needed more in-depth information about both
operational aspects of their activities and the relationships with their various
customers. The business units also faced a lack of various types of information and,
therefore, were also forced to develop a new information system. Below we will
describe the processes of developing scorecards by the business units NedTrain
Consulting (NTC) and Refurbishment and Overhaul (RO). We will focus on the
internal factors which influenced these processes.
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The business unit NTC distinguishes, apart from some supporting departments, four
line departments: Marketing & Sales, Projects, Technique, and Research &
Development. These line departments have to cooperate closely in advising NTC’s
customers. The R&D department is focused on applied research and does not carry
out fundamental research. The management wanted an insight into their activities, to
what extent these activities are able to satisfy their customers’ wishes, the quality and
pricing of their consultancy activities in comparison with their competitors, and the
relation between their activities and the financial outcomes. In order to acquire this
insight many people throughout NTC have spent a lot of time unravelling their
internal processes and investigating which the critical success factors are of the
various processes. On the basis of these analysis they developed a set of related
performance indicators. These indicators are closely related to the processes, so that
the individuals can understand them in terms of, and relate them to, their daily
activities. Therefore, NTC decided to use performance indicators at two levels: first,
the level of the department management level, and second, the sector level,  the
lowest level into which the departments’ activities are subdivided. Later on, they
decided to introduce a total quality model in which internal aspects, such as
leadership, personnel and resource management, are distinguished, and which are not
incorporated in the balanced scorecard. Every second year NTC measures customer
satisfaction and carries out a benchmark with Dutch engineering consulting firms.
NTC is now well informed about the characteristics of its various markets. The latest
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step is that they are making a real effort to set up critical success factors for their
R&D activities and to develop R&D performance indicators.
All these new practices have been set up without the support of external experts.
All the NTC interviewees (see Figure 3) are satisfied with the commitment of the
people throughout NTC in developing and using them. They argue that these practices
have changed the mindset of all the people. Now, people weigh financial and
commercial effects together with the technical ones. Afterwards it turned out that the
balanced scorecard and the total quality model were well understood by the engineers.
The interviewees attribute this to the fact that the employees are highly educated
engineers who are used to thinking in an analytical way. They are able to survey their
activities and to interpret them in abstract terms. Moreover, due to the fact that they
are forced to look at new technological developments in order to be able to give
technical advice of high quality, they have developed an externally oriented attitude.
They have many contacts with parties outside NTC. The interviewees argue that NTC
is characterised by an open atmosphere without strong hierarchical lines. The
scorecards and the quality information are discussed regularly. This information is
used for action oriented management and the individuals are committed to agreements
made. The individuals know what is going on and there is a situation of shared
responsibility. Their interests are the same and, moreover, because they have the same
technical background their values and norms have much in common. All in all, the
NTC management are very satisfied with their new accounting practices.
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At the beginning, the management of the business unit Refurbishment and Overhaul
(RO) have shown resistance to using the balanced scorecard concept at the central
level, because the effectiveness and efficiency of their activities should become more
transparent. Due to this they felt that their autonomy could decrease and that their
own activities could be questioned. It took time to make them accept the use of
scorecards. The appointment of new managers from outside with expertise in running
private companies has attributed to their acceptance. This has eventually led to the
introduction of the balanced scorecard concept at RO.
RO is a production unit with high investments in production capacity (machines
and equipment). RO used to have an internal orientation, although they are now trying
hard to deliver their services to external parties. External sales have been varying over
the past few years between 4 and 12%; the policy is to increase the external sales to
25% within five years. RO personnel has an engineering background, but, in
comparison with NTC personnel, their training is more technically (practically)
oriented. There is a strong tendency to do things as they have always been carried out.
Before privatisation the relation with Public Transport, the most important internal
customer, was very informal. Clear written agreements about the precise activities for
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refurbishment or overhaul were not made. In many cases RO did more work than was
planned and RO was not paid for the additional work due to inadequate agreements.
Nowadays, the way refurbishment and overhaul projects are calculated is still
inadequate. People are not able to specify all the activities in advance. This causes
discussions afterwards with the customers and dissatisfied customers. RO is now
accountable to the customers, whereas in the past RO determined working
requirements itself. Customers’ dissatisfaction occurs due to bad quality, overrunning
delivery times, unclear functional and technical requirements, unclear starting date,
etc.
Another development is that, whereas RO was until recently focused in
particular on overhaul, now its activities are more and more becoming a combination
of overhaul and refurbishment. Refurbishment demands new designs - for example a
new design that leads to a substantial improvement in functionality of the rolling
stock – which requires other expertise. RO has to learn how to plan the activities and
calculate the prices of such orders adequately. Therefore, it is in RO’s interest to
acquire an insight into the operational processes and to set up operational
performance indicators in order to increase operational performance throughout the
business. Moreover, in order to receive orders from external parties RO must be
competitive, and it knows that its cost level is too high in comparison with that of the
big rolling stock builders.
As the existing managements had no experience with the problems discussed
above RO hired an external consultant to support them in the change processes.
Further, RO appointed a number of new managers. With this added expertise RO
started a project focused on improvement of the management control system and the
project management system at the beginning of 1998. The balanced scorecard concept
and in particular the development of operational performance indicators formed the
core of this project. Participants in the project were RO’s central management team,
the central management accountant, the middle management and the external
consultants. After determining the critical operational processes they set up
operational performance indicators and performance targets. They developed these
figures for the various production departments and for the various levels within these
departments.
They also developed a reporting system that gives information on operational
performance. The reporting system has been set up along departmental lines and not
along the project line. They are now trying to work out the project line. The
scorecards are entirely focused on the internal production processes and on service
quality. No attention has been paid to the customer perspective. Neither have the
supporting departments been taken into consideration. The production departments
discuss their most important operational performance figures once a week. The
central management team discusses these figures monthly.
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As argued by the interviewees (see Figure 3), till now the influence of the
scorecards on the activities has been limited. The idea is to determine action on the
basis of  performance information. But it is very difficult to realise such an action
focused attitude. It is in particular on the workfloor that the scorecards have not been
used. Moreover, the distance between the central management team and the workfloor
is very large, due to which the various management levels are not well geared to each
other. That is the reason that only after an order has been completed, is the
management able to conclude that the contract terms have not been met. Although a
new management control system and project management system have been
developed and implemented these systems function only partially. According to the
interviewees, much more effort will be needed to make these systems operative.
	" 
Our investigation of the change processes at NedTrain, in particular at the two
business units, shows that internal factors, such as the nature of the activities, the
knowledge and experience of the people, and the atmosphere between the various
hierarchical lines, are very important in making a radical change. Such a change
requires a change of the mindset of people. According to the interviewees, NTC has
realised this, whereas RO has not. Greenwood & Hinings (1996) and Burns &
Scapens (2000) stressed the importance of internal factors, such as values and norms,
rules and routines, power dependencies and differences in interests. These factors are
rather general. Our investigation makes it possible to be more specific, as we can
compare change processes at two business units which are exerted to the same
external pressure to make a radical change, and which have gone through the same
change in organisational structure. We observe three important differences. First,
differences in the nature of activities, and second, closely related to the first ones,
differences in knowledge and experience of people. At NTC the engineers are
involved in activities which require an externally oriented attitude as they have to
follow new technological developments and have to cooperate closely with suppliers
of new rolling stock. These activities require highly educated engineers. At RO the
activities are internally oriented and require the use of standard technology. RO
personnel is not used to deal with customers and to look at market and technological
developments. Therefore, they have a standard engineering education. Third, the
internal atmosphere. At NTC there is an open atmosphere between the various
hierarchical levels. All people feel committed to what is going on at NTC and the
contributions they can make to NTC’s success. At RO there is a gap between the
various management levels and the workfloor. The appointment of new managers
have brought into the company new knowledge and expertise, but has not influenced
this gap. The new accounting practices were developed without much involvement of
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the workfloor. Another aspect is that the personnel on the workfloor is strongly
organised which makes them powerful. The workfloor is committed to the existing
operational procedures and has no interest in making changes.
We can conclude that the radical changes NTC and RO had to go through were
easier for NTC to make because the existing character of its internal factors had more
in common with their required character. In fact, the change NTC had to make was
less radical than the one RO had to realise.
4 #"#  +! .)&%&#*&%(&,.&+ 5
Now that we have discussed the radical change processes at the Dutch Railways in
general and in-depth those at NedTrain, we can grasp the content and the character of
these processes and their influencing factors. The aim of this analysis is to develop a
comprehensive change framework.
Organisations do not exist in isolation, they are influenced by and influence their
environment. In the case of the Dutch Railways the radical change processes were
started by the institutional environment: the Dutch government together with
European regulations and prevailing ideas about what best practices are. The Dutch
Railways had no choice between ‘do change’ and ‘do not change’. The Dutch
government is a very powerful institution, which implies that real changes in the
template-in-use had to be made. The Dutch Railways attract lots of attention from
politicians and the public, so that they know that their actions will continually be
scrutinised. Usually the source of radical changes will be found in the institutional
environment: new technology, competitive pressures, or new ideas of powerful
organisations. Innovative organisations will face internal sources of radical changes.
The way a particular organisation reacts to an external or internal pressure to make a
radical change will depend on both the strength of this pressure and the characteristics
of this organisation and its activities.
If a particular organisation has no knowledge of and experience with the new
template, it may be expected that it will use external expertise. As Greenwood &
Hinings (1996) argue, organisations in mature organisational fields, which are
strongly oriented to their own field, will face this lack of knowledge and experience.
We observe such a situation at NedTrain. NTC did not use external expertise as they
were already externally oriented and were more open to alternative organisational
forms, whereas RO did not have this expertise. Although RO introduced new
expertise from outside, it is still struggling with making the change. So, combining
external and internal expertise is no guarantee that the mindset of the people
throughout the organisation can be changed. Changing the mindset requires the
creation of new visibilities, the use of another language, and a change in people’s
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perception of their performance. Powerful groups of people can show resistance, in
particular when they are not convinced that their way of acting is counterproductive
for the continuity of the organisation. Trade unions can back up these groups in their
resistance, as we observe at RO.
The NedTrain case has illustrated that making a radical change including the
mindset of people has required various means. In order to create another
organisational reality the managements changed the organisational structure including
the external and internal positioning, introduced new accounting practices, including
new performance measurement systems and new information systems, and introduced
new expertise from outside. These means have been used in close co-operation with
each other. Therefore, their development and effects cannot be studied in isolation
from each other. The development of new accounting practices has structured the
strategic discussion and has made clear what information was lacking. Hopwood
(1987) has pointed at the importance of studying accounting practices in their
organisational context. He argues that by connecting the technical aspects of
accounting practices to the organisational context it is possible to investigate the
creative role these practices have on organisational functioning. The technique and
functioning of accounting practices are intertwined with organisational life.
Accounting practices can construct another organisational life and this other life
influences accounting processes and their consequences. This means that the outcome
of change processes influences the following change processes.
We have seen at NedTrain that individuals, both from inside and outside the
organisation, play an essential role in these processes. Without their skilful behaviour
(Nelson & Winter, 1982) change processes would not be possible. Change processes
are interaction processes of organisational life, accounting practices, skilful behaviour
of individuals and the institutional environment. Individuals are influenced in their
acting and decision making by the institutional environment. At the Dutch Railways
this starts with the cause of the radical change: the Dutch government is convinced
that the Dutch Railways can more effectively perform their tasks as a private
company. In changing the template-in-use the Dutch Railways managements have
made various decisions strongly based on prevailing ideas. The introduction of the
business unit structure and the adoption of the balanced scorecard concept are
examples if this imitation behaviour. They have accepted these concepts without any
investigation into their effectiveness beforehand. Consultants have had a strong
influence on these decisions.
Individuals are also influenced by their existing way of thinking and acting. Even
a ‘busting loose from an existing orientation’ (Greenwood & Hinings, p. 1024) has
path dependency characteristics. No individual can act without reference to past
behaviour and past routines. As Nelson & Winter (1982) argue without routinised
31
activities there will be a risk that operational knowledge would get lost, as
‘organisations remember by doing’ (p. 99).
The NedTrain case has shown that radical change processes require involvement
of all the participants on all levels. Creating new visibilities and another language,
shifting perceptions on performance and influencing problem recognition and solution
have to find their anchorage throughout the organisation. As long as the changes are
not anchored throughout the organisation (as is the case at RO), groups of individuals
will resist the required changes which will cause internal tensions and have harmful
consequences.
The description of the change processes at NedTrain has made clear that in order
to understand the changes made a processual view is required. Confronted with the
new mission neither Dutch Railways nor NedTrain had a clear picture in advance of
the actions and processes needed in order to realise the new template. The change
processes had a learning by doing character. There was no comprehensive plan which
included all the steps to be taken, because there was lack of information and shortage
of knowledge and experience. In the course of time the organisation was confronted
with the intended and unexpected effects of decisions and actions and, therefore, the
following steps were influenced by learning about the consequences of previous
actions. As Hopwood (1987) argues the new facts have to be ‘laboriously created
rather than merely revealed’ (p. 216).
Due to the path dependency and learning by doing nature of radical change
processes we can conclude that the pace of making radical changes has both
revolutionary and evolutionary characteristics. Even when all the (groups of)
individuals within an organisation are committed to the new template, as we have
observed at NTC. Another finding is that, although the NedTrain business units NTC
and RO are part of the same organisation, the change was less radical for NTC than
for RO, in particular due to differences in the character of the internal factors.
Based on the above analysis of the change processes at the Dutch Railways we












As argued above the sources of change usually will be found in the
environment, but they can also come from inside. The consequences of the
pressures from these sources will depend upon their strength and the
characteristics of the particular organisation that has to go through the change.
We have seen that various means are required to support the change processes.
These means can be traced back to elements which can be found on the meta
level in the form of ideas about best practices, templates of organising, general
social expectations etc., in the availability of instruments (the content of the
toolkit) which can be used in realising the changes, in the characteristics of the
internal and external individuals involved in the change processes, and in the
characteristics of the organisation, both the internal characteristics and those
regarding its external positioning. Figure 5 gives an overview of these
elements and their components. Both the development of these means and
their functioning are closely interrelated. The effects of their functioning, 
the outcome of the change processes, have consequences for the organisational
reality and the mindset of people. They change the way the organisation is
functioning, its internal and external positioning and people’s visibilities,
vocabulary, perspective on activities and performance, and perception of
problems and solutions. This changed organisational reality influences in its
turn the following change processes and also the functioning of the means.
Due to the fact that radical change processes are characterised by complexity
and uncertainty the individuals involved are not able to oversee the changes
and their consequences beforehand. Therefore, the processes have a step-by-
33
step and learning nature. Radical change processes cannot be comprehensively
planned.
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Meta elements Institutional pressures
Prevailing ideas
Technical elements Arguments (Transaction cost economics) 
Accounting practices
Information systems
Individual elements Skilful behaviour of internal and external participants
Orientation  







The change framework includes all the phases change processes go through. It
shows the processual nature of radical changes and the intertwinement of the
influential elements. Moreover, it indicates that the influencing elements and the
results of change processes interact with each other. The identification of the
influential elements (Figure 5) does not follow the usual distinction between internal
and external elements, which indicates the place from which they originate. We look
at the nature of their source, whether internal or external. At NedTrain we have
observed that the elements have often originated both internally and externally. So,
the internal and external roots are often mixed up and cannot be separated. Looking at
the nature of the sources deepens our understanding of the elements and their various
manifestations. Further, the framework emphasises the learning by doing nature of
change processes. The actual results of change processes, which can differ from the
intended and expected results, influence the following change processes. The
framework assumes that individuals who are involved in change processes are




Change processes are complex processes in particular when they are of a radical
nature. As argued by Hopwood (1987), radical change processes have to encourage
the organisational participants to change their interpretive scheme for making sense of
the organisational activities. This paper studies radical change processes and the role
of accounting practices in these processes at the Dutch Railways. This company was
forced to change its template-in-use (public company) into the template of a private
company. Based on the research of the change processes at this company a
comprehensive change framework has been developed. This framework is also
underpinned by various theoretical change concepts. Most of these concepts take a
partial view. In doing so in-depth studies of specific aspects of change processes are
made possible, but there is a danger that the consequences of interactions with other
change elements are wrongly overlooked. The intertwinement of change elements,
change processes and change influences are crucial in understanding change
processes.
Further research on this complicated phenomenon should be focused in
particular on radical change processes in private companies. Most of the cases
described in the accounting literature are coming from the public sector that has been
confronted with privatisation during the last decades ( Dent, 1991; Ogden, 1995;
1997). It would be of interest to investigate whether radical change processes in the
private sector differ from those in the public sector. It might also be recommended to
investigate how organisations can prepare their people for changes in their
perspectives and functioning, so that they, even in case of a ‘busting loose’ from the
existing orientation, are able to accept such a change. Now that organisations are
more often confronted with changes, having an insight into the conditions which
create an attitude of accepting changes becomes ever more important.
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